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Truth-makers there must be if not all propositions are
true—something must make certain of them true, leaving
the others as false. Existent states of affairs are the truth-
makers of choice for many semantic theorists in philosophy
of language. Invoking existent states of affairs as truth-
makers in turn involves distinct ontic commitments by
virtue of the positive correlation holding between true
propositions and the existent states of affairs that they
linguistically represent.
The new essays in this issue of Topoi: An International
Review of Philosophy, all dedicated to the topic, ‘Logic,
Meaning, and Truth-Making States of Affairs in Philo-
sophical Semantics’, shed important light on one of the
most elementary components of the theory of meaning by
which the truth-values of propositions are established. The
authors, recognized authorities in contemporary philosophy
of logic and language, discuss the basic principles of truth-
maker semantics, the relation of facts to truth, and of
ontology more generally to semantics. They consider
arguments in support of truth-maker theory, and finally
look to criticisms of received truth-maker semantics and in
some instances propose additions, refinements, and repairs
to bring some version of truth-maker semantics into service
despite the weaknesses of naı¨ve formulations. Collectively,
the essays in this special issue explain truth-maker theory
from friendly and hostile perspectives, and thereby con-
tribute to a technically competent but still accessible
philosophical discussion of one of the most important
themes in the theoretical interface between metaphysics
and philosophical semantics.
I shall say a few words about how and why I decided
to organize the essays as I did, and the editorial plan I
followed. In the process, I shall introduce the essays and
say something about how I see them fitting together to offer
an interesting picture of contemporary philosophical
thought about the merits and pitfalls of truth-making
semantics in logic and philosophy of language. There is not
a simple picture to tell, because the field itself is so rich and
the philosophical perspectives of the authors are thankfully
not always in harmony, and because the authors have not
worked in consultation or as the result of participating
together at a conference or workshop on the subject.
Authors were encouraged to write on any chosen aspect of
truth-making semantics for this issue, so that the selection
brings together here a true sampling of current philosoph-
ical argument about the nature of meaning, truth, and their
relation to truth-making states of affairs. The topic gains
part of its interest from the fact that it proposes more
plausibly than many purely formalist alternatives a direct
linkage between a proposition’s being true and the pre-
vailing states of affairs by which the world is constituted.
The study of truth-makers thus tightly links together logic,
philosophical semantics and philosophy of language in
general, metaphysics and ontology, and even philosophical
psychology and cognitive philosophy or philosophy of
mind, philosophy of art and artifacts, along with other
philosophical subdisciplines.
The volume opens with Richard Fumerton’s essay,
‘Partnership in Truth-Making’. Fumerton emphasizes a
semantic reciprocity between true propositions and truth-
makers. He describes one extremely interesting way in
which truth-makers could contribute to an integrated logi-
cal-metaphysical theory of meaning. As part of his expla-
nation of the truth-making relationship between true
propositions and their truth-makers, Fumerton criticizes
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several arguments against facts as key relata in truth-
making relations, before proceeding to the provocative
thesis that subjective thought has a role not only in expe-
riencing and expressing, but in ‘creating’, truth.
William G. Lycan, in ‘Direct Arguments for the Truth-
Condition Theory of Meaning’, then invites us to consider
his defense of two deductive arguments for a version of
truth-making that he calls the truth-condition theory of
meaning. The arguments are attention-worthy because they
advance specific reasons for accepting truth-condition
theory that go beyond and are independent of the theory’s
explanatory advantages over its competitors in semantic
philosophy. Lycan considers criticisms of the two argu-
ments, but ultimately concludes that they offer a sound
justification for upholding the truth of the truth-condition
theory. We thereby obtain in these first two essays a vivid
and compelling picture, first, in Fumerton’s essay, of what
a kind of truth-makers theory could accomplish, followed
in Lycan’s discussion by a critical consideration of pow-
erful arguments in support of another version of the theory.
Gerald Vision’s essay, ‘Intensional Specifications of
Truth-Conditions: ‘‘Because’’, ‘‘In Virtue Of’’, and ‘‘Made
True By…’’’, argues that a deflationist theory of truth,
according to which the proposition that p is true if and only
if p, is inadequate because it fails to do justice as Vision
believes it must to the transformations of the original for-
mula to such variations as: the proposition that p is true
because p, the proposition that p is true in virtue of p, and
the proposition that p is made true by p. Vision evaluates
the most hopeful deflationist responses to the objection, but
believes he has refuted them and on those grounds con-
cludes more generally against the prospects of a deflationist
theory of truth. Whether the criticism takes in all truth-
maker theories is not immediately clear, although Vision’s
analysis impressively cuts the ground out from under the
most formalistic theories. A deflationist theory in Vision’s
exact sense and truth-maker theory less formalistically
expressed must also minimally explicitly relate positive
truths or true affirmative propositions to existent states of
affairs. When this move is made, it is also natural to pro-
pose that a proposition is made true because or by virtue of
the existence in each case of a corresponding state of
affairs. This will be the state of affairs intended by the
thinker of the proposition under specific conditions of use,
by which propositions that express the existence of just
those states of affairs that are made true by their existence
and are otherwise made false. Vision’s essay offers another
contrary dialectical perspective, causing us to question the
rightness of some type of truth-maker theory, and thereby
complementing its prior interpretation and defense.
Questions of fine-grained meaning among extensionally
equivalent propositions are examined by Paul Saka, in his
essay, ‘Rarely Pure and Never Simple: Tensions in the
Theory of Truth’. Saka considers the sentence, ‘The Mat-
terhorn is 4,500 m high’, as expressing a different truth
than the extensionally equivalent sentence, ‘The Matter-
horn is 14763.7795276 feet high’. If this is right, then in-
tensionalism in some form seems to be not only favored but
absolutely required in a complete and correct philosophical
semantics. An intensional theory of meaning supports a
purely extensional logic with only a proper fraction of its
semantic resources, while at the same time making very
explicit the exact expressive limitations of a classical
purely extensional logic and philosophical semantics.
Saka’s investigation nevertheless leaves open the question
whether the two sentences do in fact express the same
truth, albeit in different ways. Must we conclude the same
for meaning-equivalent sentences in different colloquial or
formal symbolic languages? There is an intriguing string of
further questions to be explored that are hinted at by Saka’s
essay, including, most prominently perhaps, the challenge
of providing adequate identity and individuation conditions
for truths. If truths are true sentences, then Saka’s
Matterhorn sentences are evidently different; if truths are
true propositions represented by sentences in different
languages, including the mathematical languages of mea-
surement in meters versus feet, then the implications for
semantic philosophy are evidently quite different.
The next three essays are organized around a central
theme. This concerns the adequacy or inadequacy within
truth-maker theory of existent states of affairs as the truth-
makers of true positive assertions of fact. Michael Pen-
delbury, in ‘Facts and Truth-making’, responds to criti-
cisms of a previously published treatment of truth-maker
semantics that has come under fire. After more than
23 years, Pendelbury continues to oppose general and
negative facts, offering what he advances as a strengthened
rationale for their dispensability. He denies that truth-
makers must be entities, and he maintains ecumenically
that truth-makers can include anti-realistic as well as
realistic truths.
George Englebretsen, in his contribution, ‘Making
Sense of Truth-Makers’, following after but without men-
tioning Pendelbury, takes up the contrary position. Engle-
bretsen argues that propositions are made true by positive
or negative facts, which he also refers to in corresponding
appropriately metaphysical categories as presences and
absences. He denies that truth-making facts are in the
world, but prefers to construe them as constitutive prop-
erties of the world. Thus, Englebretsen is paired with
Pendelbury as defending diametrically opposed concep-
tions of truth-makers with respect to the question of whe-
ther positive facts are sufficient for all truth-making, or
whether negative facts as the nonexistence of correspond-
ing positive facts must also be brought into an adequate
truth-maker theory of meaning.
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The present editor, in his essay, ‘Truth Breakers’, argues
that negative states of affairs, the nonexistence of corre-
sponding positive states of affairs, are indispensable for full
semantic complementarity in a complete and correct
semantic theory of truth-makers and truth-breakers. Jac-
quette remarks a reductive asymmetry between truth-
makers and truth-breakers, by which iterated negative
states of affairs can be reduced to positive states of affairs,
but positive states of affairs, iterated or not, cannot be
reduced to negative states of affairs. Negative states of
affairs in philosophical semantics are in turn related in
Jacquette’s applications of this logical-semantic distinction
to such reported phenomena as presence in absence, the
metaphysics of gaps, holes, and interstitial, and the con-
ceivability of an existent but totally null universe devoid of
any positive states of affairs.
Ernie Lepore and Matthew Stone conclude the volume
with a sustained critique of metaphorical meaning and
truth. Metaphors, according to Lepore and Stone’s pro-
posed reduction, can ‘issue’ in distinctive cognitive and
discursive effects, but, if Lepore and Stone are right, they
do so in a way that can adequately be explained external-
istically as a causal phenomenon, rather than by appeal to a
semantics that recognizes the possibility of communicating
metaphorical meaning and metaphorical truth as categories
distinct from literal meaning and literal truth.
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